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1. Introduction
Researchers and philosophers have dealt with the question of the
proper method of research since the beginning of science.
Methodological questions arouse the interest of philosophers,
but we also face them continuously in actual research. How they
are decided determines to great extent the basic structure and
content of our research projects.
The development of science has been rapid and substantial
during this century. The most important developments have
been achieved in: (i) instrumentation and experimentation, (ii)
statistical methods, (iii) mathematical modelling, (iv) data
processing and computer simulations and (v) theory construction
based on the new instruments and methods. In addition the
philosophy, methodology and history of science have been
established as autonomous academic fields, which have provided
many new and important insights into the nature of science.
In the present ecological scientific community there are
established niches for empiricists as well as for theorists. The
representatives of these schools, however, have argued against
one another's existence in ecology at regular intervals. For
example, the empiricists have condemned the results of theoretical
ecology as vague concepts which cannot be operationalized, or
metaphysical statements which cannot be tested, or mathematical
exercises without biological relevance. The theorists, on the other
hand, have questioned the generalizability and biological
significance of the findings of inductive or empirical ecology.
Still other ecologists have recommended tolerance and the
peaceful coexistence of different methodological schools.
5
1. Introduction
We for our part are not anxious to deny the wisdom of
methodological pluralism as such. But we fear that the
methodological pluralism and deep-seated antagonism which
has so often characterised the relations between theoretical and
empirical ecology are both liable to exacerbate the undesirable
isolation of theory construction and data generation into
subcommunities having little or nothing to do with one another.
We believe that in the end the advancement of scientific knowledge
and understanding depends crucially on research in which
theoretical thinking is linked to data generation and in which
data generation in its turn is connected with theory. In other
words, we believe that in ecology the central problem is not the
lack of theory or the lack of data but the lack of research able to
link them systematically and critically. The description and
analysis of such an integrated research process is the focus of our
considerations in this paper.
Our second introductory point concerns the specialisation,
which has been a dominant trend in modern science. The experts
in statistics, experimentation, instrumentation, modelling,
computer simulation, etc. have contributed to solving problems
in their own specialities. Expert knowledge is of course a central
factor in the progress of modern science in general. An expert,
however, usually has the tendency to see the things from the
narrow point of view of his/her own speciality. There are,
however, several methodological questions to be solved which
requires a combination of expertise from different specialities.
For example, how should the objects of research be identified or
conceptualised? What is the relationship between theory and
mathematics or theory and experiments? What determines the
models used as the basis of statistical analysis? How are the
errors of measurement and experiment taken into consideration?
What is the evidential value of the data generated?
Proper answers to these questions require knowledge from
different specialities and a holistic methodology which is able to
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govern the whole process of research and to integrate all the
expert knowledge needed to solve research problems. The aim of
the present paper is to describe such a holistic methodology for
ecological research. We call it the Guide-Dog approach, because
we hope that it is able to guide all those who are blinded or
perplexed by the increasing technical sophistication and
fragmentation of modern science.
7

2. The Methodological
Background of Research
Empiricism. Our point of departure is empiricism, which has
been a common methodological background assumption in
ecology. In the philosophy of science the empirical approach to
research has been formulated in the so-called standard conception
of the theory construction and testing (Suppe, 1977) theses can be
formulated as follows.
The empirical character of scientific theories. Scientific
theories have and must have clear empirical meaning or content.
Theories lacking it are not properly scientific but mathematical or
metaphysical.
The neutrality of empirical data. Empirical data produced
by observation, measurement and experiment, forms a neutral
and reliable foundation for science. Hypotheses and theories on
the contrary are uncertain constructs of the human mind.
3) Theory construction by the method of induction and/or
hypothesis. Scientific theory construction is directed by data,
theories being inductive generalisations or summaries of data or
hypotheses testable and tested by data.
The fundamental idea of the standard conception is that
scientific theories are systems with empirical meaning or content;
that is, they are able to describe, explain or predict the observable
behaviour of their objects. This means that the propositions of a
theory are interpreted as describing or corresponding to universal
regularities in the object's observable behaviour. In addition to
these basic propositions theories consist of auxiliary statements
9
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needed to derive empirical consequences. So-called operational
definitions or correspondence rules which, by connecting the
theoretical concepts with observable quantities give the empirical
meaning or content of theory have a central place among auxiliary
statements .
Inductivism claims that theory construction is directed by
data collection and analysis. This means that before the data is
collected and analysed the researchers have no definite theory or
hypothesis in mind which would formulate what kind of order
they expect to find in the observed behaviour of their object.
Instead they hope that by collecting data and by exploring it with
the help of mathematical and statistical methods they will be able
to reveal or detect this order. According to this approach data
also becomes before theory, and theory as a final result of
research is an inductive generalisation, summary or abstraction
of data.
Hypothetism claims that scientific theories cannot be induced
from data, because their content regularly goes far beyond it.
Defenders of hypothetism, Whewell, Einstein and Popper for
instance, believe that in the end scientific theories can be
discovered only with the help of free and creative thinking, by
"boldly conjecturing" what the order behind the observed
appearances is. Theoretical conjectures of scientists differ,
however, from metaphysical and pseudoscientific speculations,
in one important point, in the process of theory construction their
empirical content is specified and they are tested and corrected
as the need arises. In Popper's (1963) words the process of theory
construction is the process of "bold conjectures" and "severe
testing".
Methodological controversies in ecology. Much of the discussion
concerning the adequacy of theory construction and testing in
ecology has revolved round the standard conception. Robert P.
McIntosh (1985, 245) writes that in the 1960s and 1970s many,
especially in the fields of population and system ecology, viewed
10
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ecology as finally achieving scientific status: It was becoming
"modern", "mature", "predictive", "hard", "mathematical-
theoretical" science, which is able like other mature sciences to
explain and predict the behaviour of its object by mathematically
formulated and empirically tested theories. The application of
the hypothetical-deductive method was seen as a central point in
this new, scientific ecology.
Many ecologists, however, have been disappointed at the
accomplishments of population and system ecology (McIntosh
1980). "The simple models of population growth ... simply do not
hold" (Slobodkin 1965), and the more complicated ones developed
later on were attacked by some critics as "tinkering with
completely inappropriate starting material", or that they were
"getting closer to truth in nature by adding on more mechanisms"
(Hall 1988). System ecology, on the other hand, was criticised
because "the predictive power and the generality of this inelegant
approach are very low" (Platt and Denman 1975); its belief in
stable, self-regulating and well-behaved ecosystems contradicts
the fact that disorder, randomness and "poor behaviour
characterises nature" (Simberloff 1980); and because it "does not
seem conductive to yielding general ecological principles" (May
1973).
Ecologists have reacted variously to the problems of theoretical
ecology. According to some the central methodological problem
in theoretical ecology is that theorists have too often failed to
follow the orders of the standard conception. Ecological theories
"lack the predictive and operational qualities which define
scientific theories" (Peters 1976); in ecology "the predictions of
theories are vague" (Strong 1983); "Ecology is awash with all
manner of untested (and often untestable) models" (Simberloff
1981); "again and again evidence to the contrary has been ignored
by the advocates of the theory and very weak fits of model to data
have been offered as strong support for theory" (Hall 1988).
According to some ecologists the stages of the hypothetical-
deductive approach - especially its requirement of testability -
11
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should be carried out more rigorously and consistently. According
to Simberloff (1981) we must insist "that mathematical or verbal
theory without direct, rigorous field testing no longer be
recognised as a significant contribution", and Hall (1988) states
that "we must ... tighten the link between the development of
theory and the testing of that theory. If this is not done, then we
should not accept that theory as ecological knowledge". Strong
(1980, 1983) and Simberloff (1983) have demanded that ecologists
test their hypotheses in the light of the explicitly formulated null
hypothesis.
A more radical reaction has been to question the adequacy of
the whole hypothetical-deductive approach in ecology and to
demand a more inductive or empirical approach. For example
Quinn and Dunham (1983) argue that the hypothetical-deductive
approach is in trouble when it is applied "to complex systems of
multiple causality, such as those usually studied in ecology".
They claim that in such cases a more effective method is to reduce
the observed variation in the behaviour of the research object to
"potential causal processes" with the help of data and their
statistical analysis. Petters (1976, 1980) has stated similarly that
ecological theories should be subjected to the restriction "that
their terms must be operational".
The third reaction has been to defend the methodological
autonomy or independence of ecology. According to this view
the controversy surrounding theoretical ecology does not follow
from its inadequacy or immaturity but from the impropriety of
the principles of empirical testability in the case of ecology. "The
normal criteria of scientific quality which we use as biologists are
not the same as those of the physicist and mathematician."
(Slobodkin 1965). For example Levins (1966), Levin (1981) and
Caswell (1988) have defended the general theorising in ecology
on the ground that the hypothetical-deductive approach with its
strict testability requirement errs on the meaning of theory and
the relation of theory and experience in ecology. According to
Caswell (1988) "what is needed is a more pluralistic and tolerant
12
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understanding of the bridge between theory and experiment."
The fourth reaction has been to retreat from the realistic
interpretation of a scientific theory as a representation of reality
to the so-called instrumentalist interpretation, according to which
scientific theories serve only as a conceptual device or instrument
in the systematising of data. The instrumental status of ecological
theories is often connected with the fact that in many cases they
provide a strongly idealising and simplifying picture of complex
nature. For example O'Neill et al. (1986) state that a typical
theoretical approach in ecology (the population-community or
the process-functional for instance) gives only a partial analysis
of its object. Because of this it "has as much to do with the way we
look at ecosystems as it has to do with natural world itself".
Jorgensen (1988) comments in the same spirit on theoretical
modelling in ecology: "Several alternative models can be derived
for the same environment and usually no objective method is
used to select one particular model instead of another, given the
modelling goals".
Anti-empiricism. Some later reactions in this methodological
controversy have been based on the recent anti- or post empirical
approaches in the philosophy of science. As is well known, the
origin of these anti-empirical approaches is in the criticism which
(Kuhn, 1962) launched against the standdard conception at the
beginning of the sixties. The central points in the criticism of
empiricism are as follows.
Lack of empirical content. Even the best theories in science
fail to make clear and accurate empirical predictions for many
reasons. They idealise and simplify their objects; in empirical
tests they must be supplemented with all kinds of auxiliary
assumptions, etc. Because of this scientific theories as such lack
empirical content and testability.
Theory-ladenness of data. Empirical data are not neutral or
certain. They are — as the saying goes — theory-laden or theory-
impregnated: Being produced and interpreted by theories they
13
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are therefore uncertain and fallible just like theories.
3) Theory construction in a paradigmatic context. Research
problems are usually formulated and solved in the context of a
prevailing research paradigm or program or tradition. Such a
paradigm, consisting of ontological, methodological and
theoretical assumptions and exemplars, shapes and colours the
empirical and theoretical results of research.
The most radical anti-empiricists such as (Barnes 1977; Collins
1985; Feyerabend 1975; Woolgar 1988) have argued that the
development of science cannot be analysed at all on the basis of
the classical realistic idea that in empirical tests theories confront
an independently existing reality. Instead, the images of reality
and the results of research must be seen as social constructs
determined in the end by such unepistemic factors as ideological,
aesthetic and social interest. In ecology this radical anti-empiricism
is supported by (FagerstrOm 1987), or example.
FagerstrOm (1987) bases his criticism on Kuhn and Feyerabend.
He argues that in ecology " there are no 'hard data', theories are
retained although they contradict the accepted data, and that
"agreement (disagreement) between theory and data is usually
neither necessary nor sufficient for the acceptance (rejection) of
theory". He concludes that ecological theories are not judged
primarily on the grounds of their empirical adequacy, but are
judged on the grounds of their consistency (how consistent they
are in themselves and with other ideas), their productivity (how
much they generate new research and promote the old one), and
their beauty, simplicity or elegance (how simply and elegantly
they pattern the field of multiple phenomena).
Loehle (1987) gives a less radical anti-empirical analysis in
referring to Bunge's (1968) and Lakatos' (1970) ideas of the
tenacity and development of scientific theories. The development
or maturation of theory begins from a vague qualitative idea
without clear empirical content and progresses towards a precise,
mathematically formulated hypothesis with a clear testable
content. Before the testing of theory is reasonable, a certain level
14
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of maturation is required. Too early testing represents dogmatic
falsificationism. The maturation of theory is usually connected
with the development of experimental and statistical methods
necessary to produce relevant data. When the quality of theory
and data have been developed enough, a clear disagreement on
empirical facts can be connected with the disagreements between
the theory and its rivals. In this way the acceptability of the theory
can be decided finally on the ground of the testing. According to
Loehle (1987) ecology needs "progress in the sense of Lakatos
(1970), where there is an increase in empirical content".
Realistic conception. We accept the criticism of the anti-
empiricists, without, however, abandoning the realistic
conception of the scientific theories and tests. By utilising and
synthesising ideas from different sources (e.g. Bhaskar 1975,
Bunge 1985; Giere 1988; Hare' 1970; Lakatos 1970; Novak 1980;
Popper 1983; Suppe 1989) we wish to formulate a realistic
alternative to the standard conception as well as to its radical
anti-empirical counterpart.
Realistic interpretation of theory. Scientific theories do not
describe the world as it is observed by us, but as it is in itself,
independently of us and of our observations.
Importance of theories of data generation. Because all data
and tests are dependent on theoretical ideas, it is essential to
develop these ideas into the form of a explicitly and systematically
presented theory of data generation. With the help of such a
theory it is possible to specify the empirical content of the theory
being tested.
3) Theory construction and testing in the context of the research
paradigm: Theory construction proceeds in the framework of a
research paradigm but this does not exclude the possibility of the
critical testing of the theory constructed.
In our realistic conception we make a sharp distinction between
the theoretical and empirical content of a theory. Theories deal
primarily with the supposedly real and essential properties of the
15
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Background                              
Problem                           
Theory                                               
Theoretical
model                           
Theory of data
generation  
1111111111111111n111nnn                    
model of data                       
Statistics  
11111111111n1n11111Mn=111n       
statistical
model                      
Rules of
inference               
Results                                                        
Fig. 1. The phases of research according to the Guide-Dog Approach.
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research object itself. They do not necessarily say anything as
such about how these supposedly real properties appear in the
observations, measurements, and experiments of scientists.
Consequently the auxiliary statements needed in the specification
of a theory's empirical content are not included in the structure
of the theory. Only those concepts and statements which are
needed in the specification and development of its theoretical
content are included in it.
Although we are criticising empiricism and the standard
conception, we do not want to deny the requirement of empirical
testability as such. We do argue, however, that this requirement
is formulated by them in a very misleading way for three reasons.
First, the necessary distinction between questions concerning the
theoretical and the empirical content of theory is not made.
Consequently, autonomous theoretical thinking is often criticised
as unscientific metaphysics, and the process of theory construction
is seen predominantly as a process aiming at the specification of
the empirical content of a theory.
Secondly, it gives an oversimplified and misleading description
of the process of specifying the empirical content of a theory. It is
not done as the standard conception suggests simply by adding
some auxiliary statements (called operational definitions), which
connect the variables of the theory with some observable quantities
to the basic statements of a theory. It is a much more complicated
process as we explain more fully later. Our view is that an
auxiliary theory defining the relevant process of data generation
is needed to specify the empirical content of the theory.
Thirdly, it is connected with the questionable view that data
have an epistemological priority in relation to theory. We agree
with the critics of the standard conception that data are theory-
laden, etc. We disagree, however, when the radical anti-empiricists
imply that empirical tests and data cannot even in principle have
any genuine epistemic role as evidence in questions of the truth
and falsity of a theory. From the theory-ladenness and fallibility
of data we conclude only that the acquisition of data deserving
2 105050
	 17
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the status of evidence may be and often is very difficult, and that
because of this, the process of empirical testing must be based on
a dearly-formulated and well-grounded theory of data generation.
Guide-Dog approach. The central methodological statement of
our Guide-Dog approach is that the research process must be
seen as an integrated whole consisting of conceptual and
theoretical thinking, mathematical modelling, designing of
instruments and experiments, data generation, statistical analysis,
and scientific inference. In the design of this integrated research
process the researcher also needs the skill of general and holistic
methodological thinking. Some of the most important phases in
the research project are illustrated in fig. 1 (page 16).
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to Research
Paradigms and research traditions. In mature sciences such as
physics the background to research according Thomas Kuhn
(1970) is usually crystallised in the form of a research paradigm
consisting of (i) ontological assumptions which are general ideas
on the deeper nature of the research object, (ii) methodological
and epistemological assumptions defining the correct ways of
investigation and criteria for acceptable solutions, (iii) theoretical
assumptions and models providing a more specified description
of the object of research, and (iv) some successful applications of
theoretical assumptions used as exemplars for later research. In
addition Kuhn's paradigms are embodied socially in the form of
a research community, who's members share common
paradigmatic assumptions.
Kuhn calls the research which is based on the generally
accepted paradigm normal science. He argues that researchers
working in normal science do not problematize the paradigmatic
grounds of their investigations. On the contrary they accept them
as given and try to formulate their problems and solutions in the
conceptual framework provided by the paradigm. Only in
exceptional times of crisis when trust in the paradigm is tottering,
do they begin to evaluate the starting points of their research
critically. Kuhn calls this exceptional phase of research
extraordinary science.
Kuhn analysed the role of paradigms in physical research;
others have applied his ideas to other kinds of research. Some
19
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others have developed their own accounts of the nature and role
of background assumptions. There has been, however, much
dispute about the adequacy and details of Kuhn's account and its
applicability to sciences outside physics. We believe that Kuhn
and others are right in the sense that the objects and problems of
research are not available to the researcher immediately and
independently of the preconceived ideas. On the contrary, they
depend on the framework of background assumptions which the
researcher adopts or internalises. When this background changes
the problems and solutions of research change too. It is this
insight or awareness of the existence of the deep conceptual,
ontological, theoretical and methodological commitments
underlying the more visible parts of scientific thinking which is
central to Kuhn's and others accounts of paradigms. The details
of these accounts, however, may be in need of more or less drastic
adjustments, when applied to ecology.
Paradigms in ecology. There are different analyses of the
paradigms or research traditions in ecology . For example, they
are described more or less differently by Regier and Rapport
(1978), Simberloff (1980), McIntosh (1980, 1985), Brennan (1988),
O'Neill et al. (1986) and Hagen (1989). We now add the following
analysis to this multiplicity :
At the most basic level the disagreements between ecological
paradigms or research traditions concern two interrelated
questions: the ontological question of whether the differences
between organic and inorganic nature are essential or inessential,
and the methodological question of whether the research methods
used in the investigation of organic nature are or are not essentially
different from those used in the investigation of inorganic nature.
At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when
ecology was established as an autonomous field of biology, there
were two extreme point of views on these questions, which may
be called the mechanistic and anti-mechanistic views of biology
respectively.
20
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The mechanistic approach in ecology. In the last half of the
nineteenth century physiology was for many the only true form
of biology. This physiological concept of biology was often
associated with a strongly mechanistic view of nature and science
(Coleman 1982). This view was also adopted by many early
ecologists. They practised ecology on the exemplar of the
mechanistic physical sciences. Later on in this century the
mechanistic approach has been applied especially in
ecophysiology, population ecology and system ecology (McIntosh
1985, Kingsland 1985).
The most important ontological and methodological theses of
the mechanistic approach in ecology may be formulated as
follows:
Reductionism or atomism. Causally complex wholes in
nature are reducible to more simple or atomistic parts. The
properties of these wholes are deducible from the properties of
their parts.
Universalism. Parts follow universal laws, i.e. laws which
are not restricted in space or time. Wholes, being the aggregates
of parts, follow the resultant laws, which are also universal.
3) Methodological unity of sciences. Ecology and biology use
the same experimental, quantitative, mathematical, and analytical
methods as the physical sciences.
The anti-mechanistic approach in ecology. If one foot of early
ecology was in the physiological biology of the nineteenth century
and in its mechanistic approach, its another foot was in the
naturalistic biology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
and its anti-mechanistic approach. Naturalists were impressed
by the individuality, uniqueness, variability and wholeness in
living nature, with the result that many of them questioned the
validity of the mechanistic approach in biology (McIntosh 1985,
Hagen 1989).
The basic ontological and methodological theses of the anti-
mechanistic approach may be formulated as follows:
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Holism. Organic nature consists of holistic wholes, which
cannot be reduced to more simple atomistic parts. These wholes
have emergent properties, which must be investigated at their
own hierarchic level.
Singularism. The variability of living nature is not merely
noise or appearance hiding the immutable order of universal
laws. It is an intrinsic property of living. Consequently the laws
of living nature are not universal but singular, i.e. they are time
and space bound.
3) Methodological autonomy of ecology. In ecology the
methods of the physical sciences must be replaced or
supplemented by more holistic, descriptive, comparative and
qualitative methods which are needed in ecology because of the
holistic, unique, and historically changing nature of its entities.
The argument directed by holism against the mechanistic
approach and its reductionistic thinking may be formulated as
follows: living nature is characterised by complex webs of
interactions. While a physicist can analyse or reduce the
complexities of inorganic nature into some simpler and more
basic parts and study them in isolation, the ecologist is unable to
do so. In the wholes he is studying "everything affects everything
else". This means that the traditional analytical or reductive ways
of scientific thinking practised in physical sciences must be
replaced in ecology by the holistic way of thinking, which does
not deny the irreducible complexity and interrelatedness of
nature.
The second criticism of the mechanistic approach we are
considering here concerns its universalism. Universalism assumes
there are universal laws for ecological entities, too. Critics of
universalism (Mayr 1988 and Simberloff 1980 for instance) argue,
however, that it is incompatible with the intrinsic variability,
irregularity, uniqueness, and individuality in living nature. For
them ecology is not a generalising science like physics, seeking
individual cases only as instances of universal laws. Instead it is
a historical science, or scientific natural history, describing and
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cataloguing unique individuals in historically and geographically
changing nature. We call this view singularism.
Variations of mechanistic and anti-mechanistic approaches in
ecology. It is important to note that the mechanistic and anti-
mechanistic approaches are applied variously in ecology. For
example the theoretical, quantitative, and analytical ways of
thinking characterising the approach of classical mechanism in
physical sciences have often been supplemented or replaced in
ecology by descriptive, qualitative, and numerical simulation
ways of thinking (Quinn and Dunham 1983, Levins 1966, Haila
and Levins 1993, Jorgensen 1988). In addition, some variations
combine elements from both approaches. One recent example of
this is system theoretical ecology. In some of its formulations it
combines holism from anti-mechanism with the ideals of
universalism, mathematical analysis and quantitative accuracy,
which are traditional elements of mechanism (von Bertalanffy
1968, Odum 1977, and Patten 1971, Onstad 1988).
In this paper we cannot, however, go into the details of these
variations and combinations. We limit ourselves to only the
comment that as can be seen, our definitions of mechanism and
anti-mechanism above do not take into account all these variations
and combinations. But from our point of view in this paper this
doesn't matter, it being sufficient that our definitions include the
ontological and methodological theses commonly associated
with mechanistic and anti-mechanistic approaches in ecology,
and that they throw light on the deeper conceptual disagreements
behind the idealisation controversy in ecology.
Interactive particularism: an alternative. We believe that there
is a more viable intermediate position between the extremities of
mechanism and anti-mechanism, which we call interactive
particularism. Its basic ontological and methodological tenets
may be formulated as follows:
1) Interactivism. Both parts and wholes exist. Wholes have
23
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emergent properties lacking their parts. The parts effect their
wholes and the wholes effect their parts. This means that there
are interactions between entities at different hierarchical levels.
Particularism. All living entities are time and space bound.
But their laws hold universally in all time and space regions
where the relevant conditions of their lawlike behaviours are
fulfilled.
Methodological pluralism of ecology. Ecology needs the
analytical, mathematical, quantitative and experimental methods
of the mechanistic approach, but because its objects are historically
changing entities, it needs the descriptive, comparative,
qualitative, and historical methods of the anti-mechanistic
approach as well.
Interactivism in our view consists of the following ideas. We
admit to holism that nature is not a heap of disconnected parts.
It includes systems of interconnected biotic and abiotic entities
having a hierarchical organisation, where the entities at one level
are compounded into new entities at the next higher level.
Entities at a higher level have emergent properties lacking in the
entities at a lower level. In addition we assume that the higher
level entities can causally affect their lower-level parts. This may
be called the assumption of downward causation. (Popper and
Eccles 1977, Bunge 1979, Mayr 1988.)
On the other hand we admit to reductionism in that nature is
not a seamless block or totality. It can be dissected into parts and
subsystems because there are joints in its organisation across
which forces binding parts together are weaker than elsewhere.
In addition, we admit that there is also upward causation from
lower levels to higher levels. This means that an entity at a higher
system level can be partially explained by identifying its lower
level components and their interactions with one another and
with entities in the environment of the system. The partiality of
this reductive explanation follows from emergent properties at
the higher levels.
Particularism in our view consists of the following ideas. The
24
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lawlike behaviour of ecological entities at different hierarchical
levels depends on their structure and their environment. Of
course if their structure and environment are changing, laws lose
their validity or applicability in the sense that they are unable to
describe the behaviour of an entity in its changed conditions
correctly . But this neither denies nor excludes the possibility that
the laws might have retained their validity or applicability had
the relevant structural and environmental conditions remained
unchanged. Statements of laws as such do not include the
assumption that the relevant conditions for the realisation of
laws exist or persist. This is an additional question, which concerns
the applicability or testability of the laws but not their validity as
such. (Ereshefsky 1991, Wigner 1987.)
It is this more limited form of universalism, called here
particularism, which can direct ecology in its search for laws in
a living nature full of irregularities and historical contingencies.
Ecological entities are particular systems in the sense that their
existence is time and space bound. We must, of course, avoid the
error of accepting as real a contingency or singularity which in
the end is only apparent. Particularism in our view means,
however, that we take seriously the possibility that in the historical
contingencies and singularities appearing in living nature an
irreducible remainder exists. In such cases the best and the most
that ecologists can do is to describe the states and systems they
witness; that is, to do natural history. This, however, does not
exclude the possibility of theoretical or generalising ecology. The
aim of generalising ecology is to find what is universal in the
behaviour of such entities as exist in some particular conditions
of time and space.
25

4. Theory Construction
Our view is that the construction of an ecological theory proceeds
within the framework of a research paradigm consisting of more
or less clearly formulated ontological, theoretical and
methodological assumptions and exemplars. The aim of theory
construction is to explicate in more exact and realistic terms what
is the theoretical content of our paradigmatic ideas in the question
being studied. We assume that 1) this is done step-by-step using
the method of idealisation and concretisation; 2) the use of this
method of theory construction results in models with variable
degrees of generality, realism and accuracy; and 3) the logical
structure of the resulting set of models may be analysed best
trough the so-called structuralist conception of theory.
The method of idealisation and concretisation. The use of
idealisations in theory construction has been an established
practice in physical sciences since the days of Galileo Galilei and
Isaac Newton. This method is called by different names: the
method of analysis and synthesis (Newton), the method of
resolution and composition of causes (Mill), the method of
successive approximations (Jevons), the method of idealisation
and concretisation (Nowak). Its basic steps may be presented as
follows.
First, the objects of research are analysed or reduced to their
elementary parts with the help of conceptual abstraction and/or
experimental isolation. Secondly, the basic laws and theories are
formulated using idealisations and abstractions: only the most
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essential parts of objects are taken into account, all others being
idealised away as secondary. Thirdly, the behaviour of the
complex whole is explained by combining relevant parts and
their laws, i.e. by the method of synthesis, in which the basic
theory of essential parts is supplemented or concretised by one
secondary part after another. Fourthly, the concretisation of the
basic theory is stopped when its predictions sufficiently
approximate the real behaviour of the object studied. (For different
formulations see, for example (Jevons 1879; McMullin 1985; Mill
1844; Newton 1704; Novak 1980; Such 1978).)
The method of idealisation in ecology. We defend the use of the
method of idealisation in ecology. We do not want, however, to
deny the validity of criticism that the anti-mechanists have
directed against reductionism and universalism in this method
in the physical sciences. Instead, we argue that its validity in
ecology is not dependent on the correctness of the mechanistic
approach. As we explained above we believe that there is a more
viable intermediate position between the extremes of mechanism
and anti-mechanism. In this connection, we are content to present
only the following general methodological defence for the method
of idealisation:
It is true that the extreme forms of anti-mechanism are
incompatible with the method of idealisation. If the world were
a tight totality without any identifiable parts or complete chaos
without any identifiable patterns, all idealising and abstracting
thought and consequently all science would be impossible. All
science from historical and descriptive research to the
experimental and theoretical use abstraction which always
consists of replacement of the object under consideration by a
conceptual model or representation of a similar but simpler
structure. This does not, however, presuppose the truth of the
mechanism. It is enough that the possibility of isolating the parts
and their laws from the totality of nature at least at some level of
complexity, generality, and accuracy exists.
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Structure of theory. Recently the structuralist approach has
attracted major attention in the analyses of theory construction
and testing (Blalzer et al. 1987; Giere 1988; Kuokkanen and
Tuomivaara 1992; Lloyd 1988; Stegmuller 1976; Suppe 1989;
Suppes 1957). But some formulations of the structuralist
conception (for instance Stegmuller 1976, van Fraassen 1980) are
incompatible with our realistic view of theories. There are,
however, some other formulations (Giere 1988; Suppe 1989, for
instance) which are more in accordance with it.
According to Giere (1988) a scientific theory consists of 1) a set
of concepts and statements (expressed with the words and
sentences of some language), 2) a set of models defined by these
concepts and statements, and 3) a set of statements, called
theoretical hypotheses, which fix the scope of the intended
applications of the models defined in this theory. When applied
in our realistic framework, Giere's analysis says that by using the
concepts and statements of theory it is possible to derive models,
which — it is supposed — correctly represent the real entities
under consideration at least in those respects and with the degree
of accuracy required by the hypotheses of the theory. When we
add to this the idea of theory construction by the method of
idealisation and concretisation the view that in the process of
theory construction models are derived which represent
increasingly well the supposedly real objects under consideration
results. This view is explicated in more detail in the following.
Steps in the construction of ecological theory. In the first step
the object of research is conceptualised on the bases of the
research problem and the ideas and concepts of the research
paradigm. This step results in a conceptual model of the object.
In the second step the basic elements and relationships of the
research object are identified by applying the methods of
idealisation and formalisation to the conceptual model. This step
results in the core model of an ecological entity.
In the third step the core model is enriched with additional
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elements and relationships using the method of concretisation.
This step results in the specification of the core model, called here
as the theoretical model. In the fourth step the theoretical model
is solved by fixing the values of parameters, initial and boundary
conditions and by applying the relevant analytical or numerical
calculation methods. The result of this fourth step is the special
case (model) of the theoretical model. This view of the structure
of theory is visualised in Fig. 2 (page 31).
Construction of conceptual model. The theory construction
begins with the process of conceptualisation of the object or
system under consideration. Ecologists draw the boundaries of
their systems, i.e. isolate or identify them on the bases of the
research problem and ideas and concepts of the research
paradigm,. The result of this process is a conceptual model for the
object of study.
Conceptual models often used in ecological modelling
represent objects being studied as systems consisting of a set of
compartments or subsystems with processes or flows between
them, or in more general terms as a set of elements and
relationships between them. From the environment of the system
identified the models usually mention some factors influencing
the system (called forcing functions), and some others influenced
by it (called output functions) (Botkin 1993, Jorgenssen 1988).
The ideas and concepts used in the conceptualisation of the
research object may be static or dynamic, deterministic or
stochastic. If evolutionary aspects of the object are considered
then optimality concepts and ideas may also be relevant. The
nature of ideas and concepts used in the phase of conceptualisation
fix the class of the mathematical tools usable in the theory
construction at a general level or in general terms. An additional
point is that because of our realistic starting point we interpret the
ideas and concepts used in the conceptualisation as referring to
the real properties and behaviours of the objects being considered.
We assume that starting the process of theory construction in
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Fig. 2. The structure of ecological theory according to the Guide-
Dog approach.
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the conceptual model the researcher formulates as realistic and
general a picture of the research object as possible. This means
that a conceptual model includes all elements and relations
which, according to the ontological and theoretical assumptions
of the research paradigm, are supposed to be relevant. Such a
model, however, is in most cases, too complicated and vague to
be formulated accurately enough, so that it must be processed
further. Notwithstanding its vagueness and complexity, it has an
important role in the research because of its heuristic value, being
able to direct the latter stages of theory construction.
Construction of the core model. A core model is constructed by
applying the methods of idealisation and formalisation to the
conceptual model. This results in a model representing only
those elements and relations which - according to the ontological
and theoretical assumptions of the research paradigm - are the
most essential in the set of all elements mentioned in the conceptual
model. Other elements and relations of the conceptual model are
idealised away, as secondary. In this connection it is usual that a
more accurate verbal and mathematical formulation is given to
the essential elements and relations.
The concepts and ideas used in the construction of a core
model may be called the core concepts and assumptions. We
assume that the principles of parsimony i.e. Occam's razor (do
not increase the number of core concepts and assumptions
unnecessarily!), accuracy (define or explicate the content or
meaning of the core concept and assumptions accurately enough!),
and realism (formulate the core concepts and assumptions so
that they represent the elements and relations supposed to be the
most essential in the research object!) direct the concept formation
and theory construction in this phase of research. The principle
of accuracy results often in the mathematical formalisation of the
core concepts and assumptions. This is done by utilising the
mathematical tools fixed in the conceptual model. The core
concepts may be quantified using real-valued variables, and the
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core assumptions relating these variables with each other by
some mathematical equations.
We assume that the construction of core model follows the old
strategy in analytical thinking of trying the most simple models
first. There are several reasons why ecologists should follow this
strategy, although they had abandoned the mechanistic view.
First, in some cases a simple model in terms of some basic
elements may be sufficient. Secondly, there are cases where the
limitations of our knowledge restrain us from going far beyond
simple models.
Thirdly, the adequate degree of the complexity may be
unknown at the beginning of theory construction, or it may vary
from one application of the theory to another. Fourth, there is
always an upper limit to the useful degree of complexity beyond
which the added complexity does not improve the realism or
accuracy of a model (jorgenssen 1988). All these are good reasons
to start from as simple and general a model as possible and to
proceed to more complex ones only after this model is shown to
be insufficient.
Construction of theoretical model. The core model gives an
accurate and general description of the most essential elements
and relations (or mechanisms) of the research object, but because
it omits relevant elements, its degree of realism is low. Sacrificing
realism to simplicity makes the derivation of the behaviour of the
object easier. But when it is applied in a situation where the
elements omitted have significant effects, it must be specified or
developed into the form of a theoretical model which is able to
represent the omitted elements as well.
The enrichment or development of a core model is done by the
method of concretisation, that is, by adding, in the order of their
importance, one omitted element and relation after another
to the core model. This is done by formulating additional concepts
and assumptions from the conceptual model. They represent
some elements and relations originally omitted. Combining
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them and the core model a new and more complicated theoretical
model results. Under favourable conditions this procedure would
result in a succession of theoretical models in which the latter
models approximate the real properties and behaviours of the
object investigated better than the earlier ones. (Krajewski 1974;
Lakatos 1970; Novak 1980).
Formulation of a special case model or solution. A special case
model or solution represents the effects which are generated or
caused by the elements and relationships or by mechanisms
described in the theoretical model when these mechanisms are
supposed to operate in some specified conditions. A special case
solution is developed from the corresponding theoretical model
in two steps: first, the theoretical model is supplemented by the
parameter values and initial and boundary conditions
characterising the situation to which the theoretical model is
intended to apply. Second, the analytical and 	 numerical
calculations needed in order to solve the equations of the model
are made. As the name of this model implies, it identifies one
special case in the class of systems defined in the corresponding
theoretical model.
Model verification. An important phase in ecological theory
construction is model verification. According to one definition "a
model is said to be verified, if it behaves in the way the model
builder wanted it to behave" (jorgenssen 1988). Model verification
proceeds by testing or trying out a model in different situations
and comparing the behaviour generated by the model to the
expected behaviour. The methods used in the verification differ
depending on whether the aim of the theory or model is 1) the
qualitative modelling of an ecological entity or 2) its numerical
simulation.
In qualitative modelling robustness analysis, as it is called by
(Levin 1966) is important method of verification. Its aim is to
check that the result obtained depends "on the essentials of a
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model" and not "on the details of the simplifying assumptions".
This is done by applying the essential assumptions of the model
with variable parameter values and simplifying assumptions. If
the result is always qualitatively the same irrespective of these
variations , "we have what we can call a robust theorem that is
relatively free of the details of the model". The robustness of the
model's predictions also shows that the qualitative correctness of
the model is not jeopardised because of its ignorance of the
quantitative details of its object (Kingsland 1985; Wimsatt 1981).
In the numerical simulation approach the models are usually
much more complex and "realistic" than the basic models in the
analytical approach. A central method used in their verification
is called sensitivity analysis. It is carried out by simulating the
behaviour of the model over a range of conditions defined by
different values of relevant external variables and parameters
intrinsic to the model. It shows how great a change in the value
of a relevant output variable results when a change in the value
of an external variable or an intrinsic parameter is made. As a
result of this analysis the components in the relation to which the
performance of the model is most sensitive or insensitive are
identified. The former are included in the final model and the
latter are eliminated from it as superfluous (Botkin 1993;
Jorgenssen 1988).
Dynamic nature of scientific theories. In the so-called standard
conception theory is identified with a definite set of explicitly
formulated statements (Suppe 1977). Critics of standard
conception (Lakatos 1970, McMullin 1976, Stegmuller 1976, Suppe
1977, Kantorovich 1979 and 1993, for example) have argued that
this static statement view of theory does not take into account the
fact that in the different stages of its life history or in the different
domains of its application the content of a theory maybe expressed
by sets of statements or models differing more or less from one
another. That is, the static statement view is incompatible with
the changing, developing or dynamic nature of theory.
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Critics of the static statement view of theory argue further that
the statements used in the linguistic formulations of a theory are
not its most essential ingredient. More essential are those
ingredients which make a theory a dynamic, developing entity.
These are called alternatively basic ideas, themata, models,
analogies, visions or pictures. They are something like conceptual
visualisations of the research objects. Their defining characteristic
is that they can not be fully described or emptied by statements
or linguistic formulations. They have, however, an important
heuristic role, directing or guiding the formulation of statements,
i.e. the theory construction. They are conceptual resources which
are utilised in theory construction.
We do not want to deny the role of such non-linguistic
themata or analogies in theory construction. In our analysis they
can be incorporated into the conceptual model or among the
ideas and concepts of the research paradigm directing theory
construction. But we do not want to deny the importance of the
statement view of theory, either. Because we want to interpret
theories realistically and because we want to submit their
acceptance or rejection to severe test in which the validity of their
statements is critically probed, we think that the statement form
of theory has a central importance as well.
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Data generation in the context of testing. We treat data generation
in the context of testing a theoretical model. This requires that the
theoretical model is constructed and its empirical content specified
before the actual data generation. The aim of the data generation
is to test whether the theoretical model corresponds to its object
with the desired accuracy or not. This approach in data generation
is called the confirmatory approach in distinction to the
exploratory approach, in which data is collected without any
clearly or definitely formulated theory or hypothesis in mind. We
comment on the pros and cons of these approaches later.
The intended confirmatory use of data sets its own
requirements for the data to be generated: The data generated
should be (i) relevant: it describes such features of the object that
are connected with the processes and factors of the theoretical
model, (ii) valid: it correctly describes these relevant features of
the object, (iii) reliable: it can be checked, for example by repeating
the process of data generation, and (iv) evidentially powerful: it
provides empirical evidence for or against the theory. Thus in the
confirmatory setting the researcher does not collect data without
a clearly formulated aim. He or she wants to design and implement
a system of observation, measurement and experiment, that
is, a system of data generation which is able to generate relevant,
valid, reliable, and evidentially powerful data.
Before the aim of data generation is attainable the researcher
must face and solve many refractory problems, especially in
ecology. First, the processes and factors of the theoretical model
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under test are seldom directly observable. Consequently before
the data may be generated the researcher must find some
observable or measurable features of the research object or its
environment which are properly connected with the processes
and factors of the theoretical model. Secondly, it is usual that the
theoretical model tested does not take into account all relevant
factors actually operating in the real conditions of data generation.
Before data generation the problem posed by these omitted
factors should be considered and solved as well. Thirdly, there
are many problems connected with the measurements (what are
the instruments of measurement, how do they function and
react, what are their systematic and random errors, etc.) which
should also be considered before the actual data generation.
Fourthly, there are several additional questions of the design of
arrangements or set-ups for data generation (as for example the
questions concerning the units of observation, size of sample or
experiment, levels and ranges of treatments, methods and models
of analysis) which should be considered.
All these questions must be solved before it is possible to
specify clearly what is the empirical prediction or the empirical
content of the theoretical model in the conditions of the test as
designed. As we explained earlier we clearly separate these
questions concerning the empirical content of theory from the
questions concerning its theoretical content. In our realistic view
the principal aim in theory construction is not to describe how the
object under consideration looks in our observations or
experiments but how it is in itself independently of us and our
observations. What we can observe or measure depends on what
opportunities there are to generate data and which of these are
realised and in which conditions. It is not the job of the theory or
theoretical model of the research object to describe or specify all
these possibilities for data generation. Instead it is a separate
question or a separate phase of research which the researchers
must handle when they want to submit their theories to empirical
tests. We assume, however, that in the data generation phase
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there is a need for theory construction as well: at this stage the
object of theory construction is the system of data generation as
designed.
The theory of data generation. The theory of data generation
describes or determines the system by which the data is generated.
It is like the theory of the research object in its aim of describing,
predicting and explaining the behaviour of a real system. There
is, however, a fundamental difference between these theories. In
the case of data generation, the object of the theory is an artificial
system designed and implemented by the researchers themselves.
It is not given by nature as in the case of the research object. The
theory of the research object consists only of descriptive statements
about the real properties and behaviour of the object. The theory
of data generation consists, in addition, of normative statements
prescribing the design and implementation of the valid process
of data generation. The norms and rules for valid design are
systematised in the statistical theory of the design of experiments.
Of course the general art of design of experiments and
instrumentation also includes such relevant knowledge of physics,
chemistry, biology, psychology, etc. and practical arrangements
of design that are needed in the construction of real data generation
systems.
When a data generation system is designed the researcher
must decide, which observable or measurable phenomena give
the best information about the object under study (the problem
of operationalization); how these phenomena can actually be
measured and what is the best way to measure them (the problems
of quantification and measurement); what kind of arrangements
or set ups of data generation result in adequate knowledge of
these phenomena (the problem of design of the arrangements or
setting up data generation); what are the mathematical and
statistical tools to be used in the analysis of the results of data
generation (the problem of analysis). The answers to these and
related questions outline a particular data generation system by
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constituting a theory of this system. On the other hand, the
reflection of these questions of data generation at a general level
- as we are doing in this article - results in a general theory of data
generation. We assume that such a general theory, formulated
more or less explicitly and exemplified with more or less successful
special theories, forms a background or paradigm, in the
framework of which the researchers design their data generation
systems.
Disturbances as a problem of data generation. In the ideal case,
the system of data generation is completely closed or controlled.
In such a system, the behaviour of the research object is observable
without any experimental or measurement errors. One of the
main problems is that no such real system can be completely
closed and data generation thus always remains open to external
disturbances.
There are three principal strategies for treating the problem of
disturbing factors in the data generation:
fixing the levels or values of disturbances: the values of the
disturbing factors are fixed at a constant level. A special case of
this is the complete isolation or elimination of a disturbing factor.
In such a case the disturbing factor may be said to be fixed at a
zero level. In reality, it is not possible to handle all disturbances
in this way. Thus, by this strategy it is possible to generate only
a partially closed or controlled system of data generation.
Introducing into analysis: the disturbing factor is
incorporated into the models forming the basis of analysis. This
strategy presupposes, of course, knowledge of the disturbing
factors and their effects on the data generation. In addition, it
results in a more complicated model of data.
(iii) Randomising: Randomisation is used to convert the total
effect of several uncontrolled, unmeasured, unobservable or
even unidentified disturbances into random variation. The effects
predicted by the theory are observed unbiased, through the noise
described by the distribution of this variation. The motivation to
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randomisation is analogous to insurance; it is a precaution against
disturbances that may or may not occur and that may or may not
be serious if they do occur. The principal methodological point in
randomisation is that it introduces the principles of statistics into
the design of data generation. This implies that in the phase of
design, the researcher already has to have a clear idea of the
statistical models and methods to be later used in the analysis and
interpretation of the data. Special attention is needed to guarantee
the independence of the observations. Improper randomisation
can cause serious limitations to the scope of generalisation based
on the data.
There always remains factors which are relevant but which
are not handled adequately by any of the strategies above. A
common strategy is to treat them by the ceteris paribus assumption:
"all other relevant factors being equal or unchanged". When this
assumption is added to a model the domain of its intended
validity is restricted; that is, the model can not be generalised
over the range of such factors. It is restricted instead to conditions
in which these unknown but relevant factors remain constant.
The use of the ceteris paribus assumption, however, is problematic
if it leaves completely unspecified what these restrictive conditions
are or when they are in force. In order to test a model the
researcher must know or guess when the conditions of its intended
validity prevail.
The practical arrangement of data generation usually results
from the combined use of all three strategies mentioned above.
The skills, experience, and knowledge of the researcher or research
team shape the particular combination tried. Our Guide-Dog
thesis is that any strategy or combination of the strategies to
handle the problem of disturbances must be based on an adequate
theory of the system of data generation designed.
Construction of theory of data generation. The theory
construction in the case of data generation can be analysed very
much like the case of the research object. Such theory — like all
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theories - abstracts and idealises its real object and its construction
proceeds gradually, using the methods of idealisation,
normalisation and concretisation. The relevant properties of the
data generation system are determined step-by-step. This
proceeding is stopped when a description of data generation has
attained the accuracy and realism which is considered sufficient.
In this procedure, several "iterations" or feedback rounds are
usually needed.
In the first step the system of data generation is conceptualised
or identified on the basis of the theoretical model under test and
all other relevant assumptions concerning the object, instruments
and arrangements of data generation. This step results in a
conceptual model of data generation, which should include all
factors assumed to be relevant in the system. In the second step
the conceptual model is simplified and formalised into the form
of a core model of data generation, including only those observable
or measurable quantities of the designed system which are
associated with the factors of the theoretical model. This model
is more commonly known as the operational model. It gives a
very idealised and simplified description of the designed data
generation.
In the third step the operational model is concretised or
enriched by taking into account other relevant factors operating
in the designed system (including, for instance, the disturbing
factors of experimentation and instrumentation). The model of
data, resulting from this step gives a more realistic description of
the designed data generation. In the fourth step a special case
model of data is developed from the model of data above by
fixing the statistical model, the values of open parameters and
initial and boundary conditions characterising the designed
system of data generation in some particular situation. This four-
level structure of the theory of data generation is illustrated in the
following picture:
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Fig. 3. The four-level structure of the theory of the data generation
process.
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Formation of conceptual model. The construction of the theory of
data generation process begins with conceptualisation of the
system under consideration. The aim is to outline or stipulate all
relevant components of the designed system of data generation
at the general level. This means that the strategy of data generation,
the mathematical tools to be applied, the operationalization of
the theoretical concepts, the treatment of disturbing factors, the
structure of measurements, etc. are stipulated. All these
components have their specific concepts and assumptions.
The choice of data generation strategy is made mainly between
(i) observing, (ii) sampling and (iii) experimentation. Each strategy
has its characteristic concepts, arrangements and procedures for
analysing the data. The choices of strategy also outline the
mathematical and statistical tools to be utilised, i.e. descriptions
and generalisations from sample to population or tests.
The problem of operationalization is connected with the fact
that the theoretical model seldom deals directly with observable
or measurable quantities. Let W and V describe theoretical
concepts and T the link or relation between them. The theoretical
model has the form:
W=T(V).	 (1)
Before data generation is possible, the terms in the theoretical
model have to be operationalized; that is, they must be connected
with some relevant observable or measurable features in the
object under investigation or in its environment. Alternative
operationalizations should be analysed and most suitable selected.
This choice determines the basic structure of the system of data
generation as well as the structure of the measurements.
Conceptual models are often complicated and too unspecified
for exact formulation. Consequently, they have to be processed
further during the latter stages of the design of data generation.
However, these models have an important heuristic role, forming
the framework in which the design of data generation proceeds
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and providing guidelines for the latter stages of design as more
accurate models of the designed system are constructed.
Operationalization of the theoretical model. Let Y and X describe
observable or measurable quantities and 0 the link or relation
between them. The operational model has the form
Y = O(X).	 (2)
This operational model can be regarded as operationalisation of
theoretical model (1), if (i) the observable or measurable quantities
X and Y reflect the factors W and V postulated in the theoretical
model; (ii) the form of their dependency 0 is derived from the
dependency T of the theoretical model. It is normal that the
operational model can be derived from the theoretical model
under consideration only by utilising many auxiliary assumptions.
Clear statement and critical evaluation of these assumptions of
operationalisation is necessary for the inference to be on firm
ground. The choices made at this stage also affect the observational
unit and practical arrangements needed in data generation.
The operational model says that if theoretical model (1) is true
of its object then operational model (2) is true of its observable or
measurable behaviour when it is viewed or described in terms Y,
X, and 0. This is still, however, a very idealising and simplifying
description of its observable behaviour. It describes it only from
the point of view of theoretical model (2). It omits all other
relevant factors of the object, instrumentation, and arrangements
of data generation, which in any real conditions of data generation
have their effects in the observable behaviour of the object. We
may say that the direct test of the operational model would
presuppose ideal conditions of data generation in which all
disturbing effects generated by these omitted factors were
eliminated.
Derivation of the model of data. No data generation is possible
without choices concerning the observational unit, the
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arrangements and instrumentation of data generation, since they
introduce new features into the designed system. The model of
data is derived from the operational model with the help of these
assumptions which describe the behaviour and effect of these
additional features in the designed data generation. This step is
illustrated in fig. 4.
Disturbing factors. In addition to the factors described in the
operational model, the object under investigation reacts to several
disturbing factors. To describe the behaviour of the system
exposed to these disturbances, the operational model has to be
concretised or enriched with new components. Let Z denote the
totality of the disturbing factors.
As was mentioned earlier, there are three strategies for treating
the disturbances Z: by (i) keeping them at a constant level, (ii)  
Model of
data      
Fig. 4. The schematic representation of the derivation of the model of
data from the operational model and the assumptions of data generation,
describing relevant features of arrangements and instrumentation of
data generation.
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introducing them into the analysis and (iii) converting them to
random variation. Let ; describe those disturbing factors that
will be kept at a constant level, ZB those introduced into the
analysis of data as factors or variables and ZR those that are to be
treated by randomisation. The components Zc, ZB and ZR never
cover the effects of all possible disturbing factors. The remaining
components external to the system, are denoted by ZE. When this
separation of the disturbances is introduced into Eq. (2), we
obtain the concretised operational model
Y = C (X, Zc, ZB ZR i ZE)	 (3)
The notation emphasises that the results obtained are conditional
on the external component ZE.
Fig. 5. The structure of the treatment of disturbing factors. Symbols: Y
= 0(X) operationalization of the theoretical model W = T(V), Zc
disturbances kept at constant level, ZB disturbances introduced into the
analysis, ZR disturbances treated by randomisation and ZE the external
disturbances.
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Consider, for example, a normal factorial field experiment.
The component X covers the factorial structure. If irrigation is not
the factor under consideration, it will be performed in the same
constant way among all experimental units, and is introduced
into component ;. The effects caused by variation in soil fertility
are handled by blocking. They are described in the model using
the component ZB. This component also includes the possible
continuous covariates, for example baseline measurements of
the experimental material. Randomisation handles the effects of
variation in experimental material by averaging, e.g. individual
plants and soil fertility within blocks, inter alia. The effects of a
certain year or location remain in the component ZE.
In equation (3), the disturbances have been divided into
separate components. This "Z-analysis" is based on the knowledge
and assumptions dealing with the properties of data generation
in the intended situation. It has concrete implications for the
design and the practical arrangements of data generation and
thus, of course, even on inference based on the data.
The model of data generation. Despite its name, the concretised
operational model is still quite unspecified. The roles of the
different Z-components have to be clarified.
The variation in the data is reduced by keeping certain
disturbances at a constant level. In a sense, component Z c is thus
omitted from the analysis, and the results of the experiment are
conditional on the levels or values chosen. Sometimes these
effects can be described using fixed values of certain parameters
in the model.
Component ZB includes covariates (numerical or categorical),
blocking factors and criteria for stratification. The values of the
covariates can be measured on each observational unit. Blocking
and stratification is often based on a complicated combination of
several criteria, whose values can not be measured separately.
The effect of the components of Z R is described only implicitly,
through the amount of variation or noise they give rise to. In
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order to guarantee proper handling of ZR, special attention has to
be paid to sampling and/or randomisation. This has strict
implications for experimental arrangements and collection of
data in observational studies. Let us denote this noise component
by eR. Its role in the model is to define the location and form of
the effects of these unspecified sources of variation.
When the treatment of disturbing factors described above is
introduced into the model (3), it is transformed into the model of
data generation:
Y = Dc(X, zw ed.
	
(4)
The subscript C in equation (4) is for the effects of the "constant"
component ;. As the effect of the external component Z E can not
be analysed, by definition within the experiment, it is no longer
included in the model. Data generation is always conditional to
this external component. Only analysis of the results of several
experiments can be used to obtain information of the effects of the
external factors.
The measurements. The conversion of the signals of the measuring
instruments into the quantities to be measured is usually a
complicated procedure, based often on an elaborate theory. For
instance, in electrical instruments, the electric signals provided
by the sensors are interpreted as concentration, temperature, and
so on. The measuring process is part of the data generation, and
thus exposed to several disturbances and errors. The obvious
problems connected with instrumentation and measuring are
often omitted in the design of data generation and in the
interpretation of its results. If these special sources of disturbances
are not considered with the same care as other sources, it is
implicitly assumed that it is possible to measure quantities of the
model of data generation without any errors. Usually this is not
true, and a careful analysis is required to detect, reduce or correct
the errors caused by instrumentation and measuring. The analysis
4 105050
	 49
5. The Data Generation Process
of measuring errors is much like the general analysis of
disturbances above.
The outcome of any measurement is determined, in addition
to the signal or real value to be measured, (i) by systematic
measuring error or bias, and (ii) by measuring noise. The latter is
the combined effect of a multitude of unidentified factors, and is
usually handled as random variation.
Let x denote the outcome of measurement of quantity X, bx the
systematic, and ex the random component of the measuring error
of X. They are linked together by the model of measurement
x = M(X, bx,	 (5a)
If the function M is regular enough, the value of the quantity X
can be solved from equation (5). Otherwise, additional idealising
assumptions have to be used. In any case, we get
X = m(x, sx, ex)	 (5b)
Corresponding models of measurement have to be produced for
Y and, in some cases, for Z B, too. When they are later used, lower
case letters will always refer to the resulting measurements of the
corresponding upper case quantities.
The model of data. In the model of data generation in eq. (4), the
behaviour of quantities Y, X, and ZB is linked together. When the
measurement models of these quantities are combined with the
model of data generation, the model of data is obtained. It
describes the result of data generation in terms of the outcomes
of the measuring instruments. The detailed form of the model,
with obvious notation, is
my(y, by, er). = Dc(mx(x, b, ex) , inBczw bw
 e8), eR).	 (6)
The model of data is usually rather complicated. This reflects
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reality in that the outcome of data generation is always open to
numerous disturbances.
For notational convenience, let us assume that the measurement
outcomes y and x are already corrected for their systematic
errors. The same applies to z 8, which is written for short as z. The
noise components are collected into vector e. The model of data
can now be expressed in compact form
y = F(x, z, e).
	 (7)
In sum: The model of data is derived from the operational model
with the help of additional assumptions describing the relevant
properties of the designed system of data generation, i.e. the
systematic and random disturbances which affect the object
under investigation in the designed arrangements of data
generation, and the systematic and random errors of
measurements which affect or bias observations made with the
instruments of the designed system. Because all these disturbances
of data generation hinder the proper observation of the object,
their identification is the key to effective empirical research.
The statistical model of data. Even the simplest analysis of data
using statistical arguments is based on a certain statistical model.
The statistical model includes the systematic part and the location
and distribution of the random component. In addition to its
purely statistical aspects, the practical part of data generation
should be taken into account in developing the statistical
description of the data generation. The statistical model of data
is
y = S(x, z,c; ).
	 (8)
The random component C of the model describes the behaviour
of the term e in the model (7) more accurately. This is done
through specification of the distribution of the random
component. The parameter vector it of the statistical model of
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data can be divided into two components: is = (13 ,d). We call the
parameters of the component .0 the substance parameters. They
are the parameters of the systematic part of the statistical model
and carry the central information concerning the results of the
experiment or observations.
The component d of the parameter vector 7C characterises the
error structure of the model, that is, the distribution of (the
vector) E. In addition to the purely statistical aspects, the random
part reflects the practical aspects of the data generation. It describes
the magnitudes of variation caused by the randomised effects
and measuring noise. The inferential value of the data heavily
depends on the behaviour of this component.
If all the relevant aspects of the model of data can be taken into
account, the structure of the statistical model of data can be taken
directly from the model of data. Due to the limitations of the
statistical methods available, the model used in the statistical
analysis, however, may more or less simplify the complexities of
variation postulated in the model of data. Sometimes the complex
nature of the systematic part of the model of data may cause
difficulties in estimation and testing and it may be simplified in
the statistical model used. This as well as the simplifications done
in the random part of the model of data has consequences in the
inference phase.
The model of data, especially when it is formulated accurately,
may include several random components identifying different
sources of variation at different phases of arrangements,
instrumentation and measurements. In the corresponding
statistical model these random components may have to be
humped together into one single, typically additive error term.
Since as a consequence, the amount of error (or residual) variation
may increase too much to allow any reasonable inference,
statistical models with a more elaborate error structure are
needed. They may, however, require the use specially planned
experiments in order to separate the different sources of random
variation from each other. If this is not possible, the system of
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data generation may have to be redesigned so that it can be better
approximated by the simple statistical models available for the
analysis. Understanding the nature of error variation is thus of
vital importance.
The special case model of data. The last step in designing the
system of data generation is the specification of the particular
situation in which the data is generated. The statistical model of
data determines a class of potential data generations. A special
case model of data identifies one particular member of this class
derived from the corresponding statistical model of data by
introducing the specific features of data generation. This includes,
e.g. the determination of the observational unit(s); sample sizes,
that is, the number of replications and parallel measurements;
values, ranges and/or amount of variation in the explaining
variables; the practical scheme for randomisation and/or
sampling; the properties of the measuring system. Outside this
list many choices concerning the practical arrangements still
remain.
Let as be the set of all possible choices that can and have to
be made in the course of the data generation process. Any
element wasdetertnines a single data generation scheme which,
when applied, produces data that in a reasonable way can be
analysed using the statistical model S. The special case model of
data is the pair (S, w), where we as.
The choice of the levels and ranges of treatment factors and the
distributions of variables has implications for sampling. The
number of replicates or sample size has to be based on the
expected magnitude of errors, the desired accuracy of the estimates
and the power of the tests based on the statistical model of data.
Estimates of the magnitudes of variation caused by measuring
errors and other disturbances which are needed here, can be
obtained from past experience, literature or specially arranged
experiments in the intended conditions.
Simulation is an important and commendable procedure to be
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applied at this level. Using simulation the researcher can study
the behaviour of the designed system before its actual use. It is
important to know how sensitive the designed system is to the
values of the parameters to be fixed for the special case model.
Different special case solutions can be compared by simulation.
The implications of the simplifications leading from model of
data to statistical model can also be studied. It is also possible to
check the effects of initial and boundary conditions characterising
different assumed conditions of data generation. The researcher
may thus learn that there are considerable differences between
alternative designs of data generation. All this may result in
improvements in design of the arrangements and instrumentation
of data generation.
The severe testing of a theory, as will be explained later in
detail, presupposes that clear predictions or expectations
concerning the behaviour of the data to be generated in some
particular situation can be derived from this theory. This is not
possible unless the data generation process is well understood.
The design of data generation must thus result in a special case
model of data in which: (i) the form of the systematic part is based
on the theory under test and on the model of data determining the
Z-factors of the designed system; (ii) the form of the distributions
are determined and the parameters describing the distributions
have rough estimates; (iii) unexpected or critical results of data
generation can be clearly defined in terms of the model parameters
and (iv) the sample size or number of replicates is large enough
to allow adequate statistical power for detection of unexpected
behaviour .
As we have seen, there are several choices and alternatives on
the road to data generation: these are connected with the
conceptualisation of the designed system, the operationalization
of the theory, the quantification of the factors to be measured, the
instrumentation and arrangements for data generation, the
mathematical and statistical tools of analysis, and the choice of
the particular conditions in which the designed system is to be
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used. Data of high evidential value are obtained only if all these
choices are well justified and they result in a balanced system of
data generation.
55
56
6. Analysis of Data
When a theory is tested, the researcher has two points of view on
the behaviour of the object under study: that of theory and that
of data. The theoretical point of view results in the statistical
model of data or its special case formulation. Expectations of the
observable behaviour of the object under the particular conditions
are formulated here. The data point of view is reflected through
the statistical model, too. Using the data, the values of the open
parameters of the statistical model (8) are estimated. This enables
the comparison of the expected and the observed behaviour of
the object, which will test the correctness of the theory in the light
of the data generated.
The statistical model may be regarded as a tool for treating the
data so that correct conclusions concerning the validity of the
theory may be drawn. The tool, however, must be adequate for
the conclusions. The assumptions concerning the distribution of
the random component of the statistical model are crucial in the
analysis.
Assumptions of statistical analysis. The theoretical ground of
statistical methods is mathematical statistics. Results of the
sampling behaviour of the parameters estimated are obtained
assuming that the variation handled as random follows a known
distribution. Classically, it has been the normal distribution. In
the context of generalised linear models, several other
distributions are covered in a unified way. Understanding the
rationale of the assumed distributions forms a basis for choosing
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the right statistical models. For example, the central limit theorem
often justifies the use of the normal distribution. If these
distributional assumptions are not met in the data generation,
the value of the results of statistical analysis is problematic.
Independence of observations is another important assumption
underlying the statistical analysis. If the observations depend on
each other and if the dependence structure is not properly
modelled, then the result usually underestimates the amount of
residual variation and thus overestimates the precision of the
estimates.
The validity of these assumptions can to some extent be
checked by studying the behaviour of the residuals of the statistical
model. Of course, data alone can never be a sufficient justification
for these kind of theoretical assumptions. Thus the requirements
these assumptions pose for the arrangements of the data
generation, especially for sampling and randomisation, are of
vital importance. Overlooking them threatens the validity of the
statistical analysis.
Evaluation of the statistical model. Unexpected systematic
behaviour of residuals indicates that the assumption of
randomness is doubtful. Shortcomings in the systematic part of
the statistical model may result in systematic behaviour of the
residuals. If the systematic component is correctly specified, the
residuals carry the effects of those factors that are treated by
randomisation in the experimental arrangements and
measurements.
Possible outliers (i.e. existence of a single observation or
group of observations lying outside the limits of variation of the
other observations) should also be checked. Data includes odd
observations quite often. Apart from such evident reasons as
errors in coding or performing the measurements, the detection
of outliers can reveal important variables to be controlled or
included in the model of data.
The critical point in the evaluation is the amount of error
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variation. It should be small enough to allow sensible conclusions
concerning the parameter values of the systematic component
from data obscured by random noise. It is thus an important
factor in the evidential or inferential value of the data generated.
Theoretically, the easiest way to reduce it is by increasing the
sample size. It is most efficient when the sample sizes are small,
but with increasing sample sizes the relative efficiency of
additional observations decreases. A more efficient way often is
to identify the sources of variation and eliminate them. The latter
method is, of course, more demanding, but results both in better
understanding of the phenomenon and more accurate results.
Our thesis is that a clearly formulated and well-grounded
theory of data generation increases the researcher's opportunities
to design an effective system of data generation fulfilling the
assumptions underlying analysis; to evaluate correctly the
possibility of finding theoretically interesting effects with the
system designed and to locate correctly the sources of anomalous
behaviours in residuals. In other words, a well-founded theory of
data generation is a central condition for the quality of results in
the statistical analysis of data. (Statistical textbooks usually view
statistics as a field of mathematical science. This is reflected in the
terminology, according to which statistical methods are "applied"
to the real data. There are, however, several books in which the
aim has been to cover the gap from the theory to the statistical
model appropriate to analyse the corresponding data. See the
writings of Cook and Campbell (1979), Fuller (1987), Hinkelmann
and Kempthorne (1994), Kempthorne (1973), Kish (1987), Maxwell
and Delaney (1990), Milliken and Johnson (1984), Sheffe (1959)
and Wang (1993), for instance.)
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7. Scientific Inference
The basic problem of scientific inference. By scientific inference
we mean the process of drawing conclusions from data and other
relevant considerations concerning the validity of theory. When
the validity of theory is evaluated on the basis of data alone the
premise of inference consists of the data dealing with some
observable phenomena. This kind of observational premise is
limited to a finite number of observations in a finite and fixed
number of space and time points. The conclusion from inference
consisting of a theory or model is instead general and theoretical
by nature. Now the basic problem of scientific inference may be
formulated alike the problem of generalisation: when is a general
and theoretical conclusion justified on the basis of singular and
empirical data? When are the events described in the data really
caused by the factors and mechanisms postulated in a theoretical
model?
It is important to recognise that the problem of generalisation
cannot be reduced to a standard problem of statistical inference.
The rules of statistical inference can be applied only to such
populations, which can actually be sampled. The intended domain
of application of a general theory is not limited into any particular
sample population nor any finite number of sample populations.
Because of their general nature, theories are not restricted to the
present, but also cover the future The future, however, can not be
sampled today. This means that the problem of generalisation
from data to theory cannot be solved on statistical grounds only.
Something more is needed, as was pointed out already in the 17th
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century by David Hume (1748), in his early criticism of inductive
generalisation. This is the assumption of induction or, as Hume
called it, the assumption of the uniformity of nature: The future
is like the present or the past. A more general formulation of this
assumption is that those parts of the domain of the theory which
can actually be sampled form a representative sample of all
phenomena included in the domain of the theory. With such an
additional assumption it is, of course, possible to generalise from
the sample to the intended domain of the theory. But the validity
of this assumption of inductive generalisation cannot be known
on the basis of experience since all efforts to prove its general
validity already presuppose it. It can only be accepted as an a
priori truth, as a pragmatically useful principle or as an arbitrary
guess. All these solutions seem incompatible with the common
notion that scientific knowledge can be proved by experience.
Thus it is evident that in order to handle the basic problem of
scientific inference adequately it is not enough that the principles
of statistical inference be studied and followed. Some more
general methodological and epistemological questions concerning
scientific inference and proof must also be considered.
The methodology of strong inference. We begin our
methodological comments concerning scientific inference with
K.R. Popper's methodology of falsification. We think that in this
methodology one can find some very important insights on how
to handle the basic problem of scientific inference.
According to Popper (1959, 1%3, 1983) the degree of evidential
support the data gives to the theory depends crucially on the
severity of the test. In a severe test the theory runs a realrisk of
being in error or of being refuted by the data. In order to be
severely tested a theory must say before the testing what kind of
data is forbidden if the theory is true of its intended domain of
application. That is, it must specify before the testing, what its
empirical content in the designed test is. The theory is tested by
making serious attempts to find some forbidden or falsifying
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data. In a severe test of a model the data is generated especially
from those parts of the domain of the model, where the validity
of its statements and predictions is not already known but, on the
contrary, most suspected in the light of the current knowledge.
Such parts are, for example, those in which the theory is able to
make precise predictions concerning some new phenomenon
contradicting current knowledge. Only if such severe tests fail to
find forbidden or falsifying data is the theory confirmed or
corroborated by the data.
From Popper's rule of the severity of test it follows that the
data which was known and exploited when the theory was
constructed, is unable to give any real or genuine support to the
theory. When a theory is motivated by data or tailored to fit it, we
know, of course, without any test that it will agree with this data.
Such data does not involve any severe test or real risk of refutation
of the theory, and consequently cannot support it either. On the
other hand the data which is predicted by a theory but not known
or exploited in its construction, is able to give genuine support to
the theory. In this case, we cannot know before hand and without
the test that the theory's prediction is true. The theory also runs
a real risk of refutation with such new predictions and
consequently such tests are severe and may result in genuine
support for the theory.
We call this Popperian formulation of the rules of inference
the strong inference formulation (Platt 1964). Popper justifies it as
follows: first the aim of science is to develop better and better
explanatory theories, which represent more and more truthfully
structures, entities and regularities in the world. Because of this
the basic problem of scientific inference is to separate the theories
with real or genuine explanatory power from those lacking it. A
central empirical criterion in this is the ability of a genuine
explanation instead of an ad hoc explanation (i) to transcend the
facts or data already known, (ii) to predict new or independent
facts (they may exist in the past, too) not known or exploited
when the theory was first constructed, and (iii) to pass successfully
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some tests concerning these new or independent predictions.
Secondly, there is a logical asymmetry between the verifying
inference arising from positive data and the falsifying inference
arising from negative data. It is not possible to infer inductively
from the observed validity of the theory in parts of its domain
investigated or sampled its validity or probable validity in the
uninvestigated parts without making unjustifiable assumptions.
But it is possible to infer the falsity of the theory from its observed
falsity in the investigated or sampled part. This is a valid deductive
inference: The theory cannot be generally true or valid of its
domain if there is some part in which it is false. This logical
asymmetry is according to Popper the logical core of the scientific
inference around which its rules and strategies revolve. The role
of empirical data in inference is not to prove the truth or probability
or reliability of the theory, but to test or to probe its validity.
Standard criticisms of strong inference. There is, however, a
battery of standard objections to the rules of strong inference.
Many of them have been presented by the critics of empiricism.
We limit ourselves to the following four objections:
Theories as such have no empirical content. They do not
define any critical region of forbidden data. The empirical content
of a theory is definable only by using all kinds of auxiliary
assumptions and theories. When the predictions fail, or data is
not as expected, there are many possible sources of error among
these auxiliary assumptions. The falsifying power of negative
data can be directed to the theory only if it is assumed that the
necessary auxiliary assumptions are unproblematic or valid
(Lakatos 1970, Feyerabend 1975).
All theories and models are strictly speaking false: They
idealise and simplify the world and give a very imperfect
representation of it. Because of this it is possible almost always to
find some anomalous, negative, conflicting or "falsifying" data
from their intended domains of applications (Krajewski 1974,
Lakatos 1970, Nowak 1980).
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In this situation the strong inference is not a very interesting
or constructive strategy of research. Because the scientists know
already before the testing that their theories are incomplete, they
are not interested in testing them severely. Instead of falsifying
instances they try to find verifying instances for their theories
and instead of the absolute evaluation of their validity they are
content with their comparative evaluation. The crucial question
in comparative evaluation is: how do the models succeed in
relation to each other, when their performances in some common
domain of application are compared? It does not matter if outside
this domain one or other or even all of them must be considered
as false. In the world of complex phenomena, of imperfect
models and of uncertain data it is the verifying instances and
comparative theory evaluation that direct the research (Kuhn
1962, Lakatos 1970, Laudan 1977).
The logical relationship between theory and data is not a
deductive one as presupposed by strong inference. Consequently,
there is no falsifying data from which the falsity of a theory
follows deductively. Strictly speaking all theories in all sciences
are tested by formulating relevant statistical models and
hypotheses. The problem for strong inference is that statistical
models do not predict any specific data; rather they give a
probability distribution for all possible data. According to such
distribution some data are more improbable than others. But no
data is forbidden or excluded in the strict logical sense; that is,
statistical models have no clearly specified empirical content
against which they would be severely testable and strongly
falsifiable (Howson and Urbach 1989).
Comment on criticism of strong inference. We do not want to
deny that the critics of strong inference are correct in many
important points. We argue, however, that their conclusion
concerning the inapplicability of strong inference in actual research
is incorrect. For example, the above objections can be commented
on from the point of view of the strong inference as follows.
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Of course the epistemic status of the auxiliary assumptions,
which are needed in the specification of a theory and in the
determination of its empirical content in some particular test,
may be so uncertain that the falsifying power of possible conflicting
data is watered down. But this only means that this test is
disqualified as a severe test of the theory in question. In such a
situation, the need to develop a stronger test with more justified
auxiliary assumptions arises.
It is true that all our theories are imperfect and strictly
speaking false. But if we are realists, we want our theories to be
at least partially true or truthful about some objects in their
intended domain of application or that they represent these
objects correctly at least at some limited level of accuracy and
generality. Because of this and because we want to avoid drawing
erroneous conclusions from their (limited) validity, we want to
test them severely too.
Comparative theory evaluation is included in the original
Popperian formulation of the strong inference as well. According
to Popper (1963 and 1972) theories or models cannot be proved
true or truth -like or probable on the basis of data. They can,
however, be tested by data and they can achieve the epistemic
status of conjectural or tentative knowledge on the basis of
success in severe tests. If among the alternative models there is
one which — in spite of running the risk of refutation — is able
to pass severe tests directed at it more successfully than its
competitors, then this theory or model can be accepted in the
light of this comparative critical testing as the best conjectural
knowledge we have so far.
Statistical models as such have no empirical content. But
this means only that if we want as we usually do — to evaluate
the validity or acceptability of a theory using data and by utilising
statistical models, we must specify the empirical content of the
statistical models used as well. This means that we must
supplement our statistical models with such auxiliary
assumptions or decisions as: if the data are too improbable (their
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probability is below some pre-set minimum value) in the light of
statistical model used, then these data are accepted as critical for
the rejection of this model and the theory from which it was
derived.
Adjusted strong inference. Now we can formulate a summary of
our position in this methodological disagreement. We believe
that it is possible to combine Popperian strong inference with the
critical comments on the limitations and difficulties of testing.
Putting these points together, we arrive at the following adjusted
form of strong inference:
Our aim is to find theories, which describe, predict and/or
explain the phenomena of living nature correctly. This correctness
is in addition strongly supported by evidential data and other
accepted knowledge.
We must formulate our theories strongly and definitely in
the sense that they are able to structure clearly the space of some
possible data, and we must submit them to severe tests in the
sense that we make serious attempts to find actual data, which
are incompatible with the postulated structure of data.
We must analyse our data generation and background
knowledge very critically before we draw our conclusions, because
there are many possible sources of error among the auxiliary
assumptions used in the specification and operationalisation of
our theories and in the generation of our data.
A clearly formulated and well-grounded theory of data
generation is an important aid when the theory and the data
conflict with each other and the source of error must be located.
We may, of course, always be in error when, from the data fitting
or conflicting with our theory, we draw the conclusion that our
theory is corroborated or falsified. But this means only that all
models, theories, data, tests and conclusions in science are and
remain conjectural or tentative by their nature. These uncertainties,
however, do not exclude the possibility that we may have some
good epistemic — although fallible — grounds for rejecting
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some theories and accepting others after critical testing. If and
when the need arises, every acceptance and every rejection can be
re-evaluated later in the light of new critical evidence.
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Testing of Theory
Scientific inference in the context of testing. The aim of scientific
inference in the context of testing is to answer the following
questions: 1) does or does not the operational model fit the actual
data within the limits of acceptable error? 2) what does this fit/
lack of fit tell us about the evidential support for the theoretical
model? and 3) if the fit is not as expected, where the error is
located?
As was said before, a central point to be remembered in the
context of testing is that the auxiliary assumptions used in the
construction of a theory and in the specification of its empirical
content in some test situation should be recognised and checked.
These assumptions are listed in Fig. 6 (page 70).
In ecology, especially where the complexities in the research
objects, imperfections in theoretical models and errors and
complications in the data generation are common, it is only to be
expected that any attempt to test a proposed theory may change
into an attempt to develop the theory and a revised process of
data generation relevant to it. In other words the context of theory
construction and the context of theory testing or evaluation are
not separated but tightly interconnected in the actual research
practice of ecology. This central point is incorporated in our
following analysis of the process of scientific inference in the
context of testing.
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TM	 Assumptions ofA 3	 operationalisation
OM	 A 4 Assumptions ofdata generation
MDA 5 Assumptions ofanalysis
Assumptions
of initial and
boundary
conditions
Derivation of
theoretical model
Derivation of
operational model
Derivation of
model of data
Derivation of statistical
model of data SM	 A6
Derivation of special
case model or prediction 	 SCM
Fig. 6. Auxiliary assumptions (A1-A6) needed in the derivation of an
empirical prediction or a special case model (SCM) from a theory by
constructing its theoretical content with the help of a conceptual model
(CM), a core model (CM), and a theoretical model (TM) and by
specifying the empirical content or prediction (SCM) of the theoretical
model in a test designed with the help of an operational model (OM), a
model of data (MD), and a statistical model (SM).
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Check-list of scientific inference. Before the researcher draws
conclusions from data concerning the validity of a theory or
model, she or he should check the following points especially:
Quality of implementation: was everything in the actual
data generation done as was designed in the theory of data
generation? This checking may reveal some plain errors,
inaccuracies, and uncertainties which can easily be corrected and
independently justifiable ways (as is the case with some errors in
the handling or operation of instruments, coding the instruments
readings, defining the sample sizes, and so on).
Quality of measurements: in addition, the behaviour of the
measuring instruments should be controlled especially as regards
to the magnitudes of the systematic and random errors of
measurement. This means that the values of the parameters,
which in the models of instruments characterise the distributions
of measuring noise, should be estimated. The identification of all
kinds of odd behaviour in measurements is also important. The
quality control of data and data generation results in better
understanding of the magnitude and source of errors in the final
results of inference.
Assumption of randomness: the assumptions concerning
the distribution of the random component of the statistical model
are crucial in the analysis. If these distributional assumptions are
not met in the data generation, the value of the results of statistical
analysis is problematic. The validity of these assumptions can to
some extent be checked by studying the behaviour of the residuals
of the statistical model. If they indicate systematic behaviour the
assumption of randomness is doubtful. It is of course impossible
to check the residuals for all possible forms of dependency.
However, evident dependencies involving e.g. time, space or
persons should always be taken into account.
Magnitude of residual error: if the amount of residual
variation is larger than predicted on the basis of the known or
assumed experimental disturbances and measuring noises,
sensible conclusions concerning the parameter values of the
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systematic component cannot be drawn. The problem of how to
control it arises. Theoretically, the easiest way is by increasing the
sample size. This is efficient when the sample sizes are small, but
with increasing sample sizes the relative efficiency of additional
observations decreases. Often a more efficient way is to identify
the sources of variation and eliminate them. This, of course, is
more demanding, but results both in better understanding of the
phenomenon and more accurate results.
Outliers: The data is contaminated by outliers (i.e. by
observations lying outside the limits of variation of other
observations) quite often. They may follow from the errors made
in the coding or performing of the measurements. It is possible as
well that behind them there are some omitted variables which
should be controlled or introduced into the analysis. This would
presuppose, however, the correction of the original model of data
or the statistical model derived from it.
Derivation of statistical model: the statistical model is
derived from the model of data with the help of assumptions
which often simplify the complexities of actual (systematic and/
or random) variation postulated in this model. Now, an important
question is: what is the nature and magnitude of errors caused by
these simplifications? If it is considered too large, the statistical
model should be modified.
7) Derivation of the model of data: the model of data is derived
from the operational model by introducing some of the other
systematic and random factors, which in addition to the factors
of the operational model affect the process of data generation. Is
it possible that the model of data gives a too simplified or
inaccurate picture of the disturbing factors in the system of data
generation? Is it possible to develop a more realistic model of
these disturbing factors from the theory of data generation? Or
was the whole theory of data generation in error in assuming that
the system of data generation defined by it was able to yield
relevant, valid and reliable data on the factors of the operational
model.
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Derivation of operational model: the operational model is
derived from the theoretical model with the help of the
operationalisation assumptions connecting the factors of the
theoretical model with some observational or measurable
quantities. Is it possible that these assumptions are incorrect and
consequently the data collected about the factors of the operational
model gives the wrong picture of the factors of the theoretical
model?
Severity of test. Does the data generated represent a severe
test for the theoretical model? The severity of the test is high if the
theory predicts data, which are new and unexpected or not
utilised in the construction of the theory and if the critical zone of
the expected errors of observation, measurement and experiment
is narrow enough for sensible conclusions. Now it is possible that
the measuring noise and experimental disturbances are larger
than expected, or that the models are corrected and adjusted in
the light of the test data. In both cases the severity of tests and
consequently the evidential value of the generated data is spoilt.
Derivation of the theoretical model: Does the theoretical
model used approximate the object of study with sufficient
accuracy? Or is it possible to specify or concretise the core model
in the form of an alternative theoretical model able to explain the
possible discrepancies between the original model and data as a
consequence of the insufficient degree of fit of the original
theoretical model?
Derivation of core model. It may be that all corrected
theoretical models derived from one and same core model using
different kinds of additional assumptions fail in to agree with the
data as well. But before the researcher concludes from this that in
his/her research paradigm the object of study is erroneously
conceptualised, he/she should check whether it is permissible to
change or to correct the formulation of the core model within
some limits without implying mean the rejection of the original
research paradigm. Is it possible to derive a new theoretical
model that agrees better with the data from the corrected core
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model; that is, from the corrected view of the most essential
elements and relations in the object?
The researcher should, however, be very critical in using the
old data in the evaluation of the validity of a corrected theoretical
model or a theoretical model constructed from a reformulated
core model. If the corrected models take into account such new
aspects of the object under study that are not clearly or reliably
reflected in the old data, and/or if it is not possible to justify the
corrections in the models independently of the old data, the
relevance and the evidential power of these old data is
questionable. In this situation a new theory of data generation
and its implementation is needed before it makes sense to maintain
the inferences concerning the validity of the theoretical models
developed in the research project.
Different criteria of evaluation. Data is only one of the kinds of
evidence or criteria used in the evaluation of a theoretical model.
Another important criterion is that of theoretical support: how
coherently can the results be added to or connected with
established knowledge? Are the problem and its proposed
solution meaningful, important and warranted in the light of
current knowledge?
Different criteria of evaluation, however, may result in
conflicting judgements of the validity of a proposed theoretical
model. For example, it is possible that a developed theory fits the
data but is incoherent in the established theoretical background
knowledge or vice versa. In such situations of conflicting evidence
the overall evidential support of the theory depends on the
evidential weight which has been given to the data and to the
current knowledge respectively.
According to Kuhn, for instance, the theoretical fit or support
is often able to immunise the proposed theory from the conflicting
data. This happens especially when a theoretical model is
developed in the framework of a paradigm, to the correctness of
which the researchers are committed. On the other hand the lack
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of fit with such an established theoretical background may
neglect the support which the fit with data can give to a new
theory. As the history of science shows, profoundly new and
original theories find seldom an immediate and general acceptance
especially if they disturb the established ontological, theoretical,
experimental and methodological conceptions too much.
Without doubt there is much sense in this inertia of established
knowledge. Many of the bold ideas are simply incorrect and are
able only to put research on the wrong track. But, on the other
hand, it is true that there are cases, where one step ahead has
presupposed two steps back in orthodox thinking; that is. the re-
evaluation of the current state of knowledge. The current state of
knowledge as a background to research thus cuts both ways: it
eliminates false starts, but it is possible that it eliminates true
starts as well. Because of this the researchers need the skills of
critical and creative thinking in order that they do not fall into the
trap of the established but erroneous conceptions.
Although the recognised goal of research is or should be to
find a clear and strong support for or against the proposed
theory, the attainment of this goal is often very difficult. We think
that because of this it is very important that the processes of
theory construction and data generation be clearly recognised
and critically analysed. This increases the possibilities of
overcoming the difficulties often encountered in scientific
inference.
Exploratory and confirmatory approaches in ecology. According
to Quinn and Dunham (1983) strong inference and its hypothetical-
deductive or confirmatory approach is in trouble particularly
when it is applied "to complex systems of multiple causality,
such as those usually studied in ecology". The trouble is that it is
not possible to specify clearly the empirical content of hypotheses
(that is, their empirical predictions) in situations where causes
are various, interconnected and unisolatable. Because we utilise
strong inference and its confirmatory approach in our Guide-
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Dog Approach, it is important to raise this point.
According to Quinn and Dunham (1983, 603) ecologists do not
generally follow the hypothetical-deductive or confirmatory
approach of strong inference. Instead they "rely usually on a
methodology much akin to statistical hypothesis testing", which
differs from the hypothetical-deductive methodology "in being
largely inductive". In this methodology the aim of the researcher
is to explain the observed variation in the behaviour of the
research object by exploring and identifying "potential causal
processes" and "their probable contributions" to that variation
with the help of statistical methods.
We do not want especially to criticise the pure exploratory use
of statistical methods in situations where meaningful theories or
hypotheses are lacking. Such explorations may have heuristic
value in the discovery of a new theory or hypothesis. In situations
where the possible causes are well-known or can be guessed and
the task of the researcher is only to estimate from the data which
of them have an effect and what kind of effect in the variation
under consideration, the exploratory approach is in order. At this
stage, however, the explorations are not purely empirical; that is,
done without any theory or hypothesis in mind, but are directed
by a more or less specific, general or well-grounded theory that
the relevant causes are of such and such a kind. Because of this •
they may be called theoretical or theoretically directed
explorations. They form, as it were, an intermediate class between
more empirical exploratory approaches and more theoretically-
articulated confirmatory approaches, combining some elements
of both.
Our critical comments concerning the use of the exploratory
approach are as follows: First, it must be remembered that the
evidential support provided by the data for the models found by
exploring this same data with the help of statistical methods - as
for example with the help of the method of curve fitting - may
shrink to nothing. This is because the correlations in the data may
be completely spurious and the statistical methods as such are
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not able to differentiate the spurious correlations from the genuine
ones; that is, from those correlations that reflect real causal
connections. The models found by statistical exploration should
be tested critically against independent data.
Secondly when we utilise exploratory research design we
must avoid soft or weak inference practices, which according to
Meehl (1967, 1978) characterise the established practice of the
statistical hypothesis testing in such soft areas of research as
psychological and behavioural research. Meehl argues that
researchers in these areas often combine exploratory use of
statistical hypothesis testing with the preconceived ideas in the
following way.
They have their theories, but contrary to the requirements of
strong inference they do not specify any clear empirical content
for them before data generation and consequently do not submit
them to severe tests either. Instead they are content to explore
data in order to find statistically significant dependencies. When
one is found, that is, when they succeed in the rejection of null
hypothesis of the non-existence of some dependency they interpret
it as confirming their preconceived idea, which is then interpreted
as predicting just this dependency.
But when they fail to reject the null hypothesis they do not
interpret it as rejecting or falsifying their ideas; rather, they
explain this failure away by assuming ad hoc (that is, without
independent evidence), that the source of error is located not in
their ideas but in inaccurate operationalizations, insufficient
sample sizes, unexpected errors of measurement or in other
design deficiencies. In addition they usually "treat the confirming
instances and the disconfirming instances with equal
methodological respect". They think that if there are more
confirming than disconfirming instances (tests), the theory can
be said to be supported by data. This is "a truly remarkable
failure to recognise the logical asymmetry" of the verifying and
falsifying tests.
In this way their preconceived ideas sooner or later attain the
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status of a publishable result because it is "supported" by
statistically significant data. But these researchers have been in a
"no lose" situation the whole time : if data is as expected, theory
wins, if it is not, data loses.
Meehl's description and criticism of the soft inference practices
in the use of statistical methods is important, because there are
similarities between ecological and behavioural research in this
regard. We agree with Meehl that this kind of inference must be
criticised and abandoned. Meehl however seems to think that the
statistical methods share the blame for the errors of the soft
inference. According to him (1978, p. 254) scientists in the soft
areas of research are so used to swimming "in a sea of
stochastologicals" that they have failed to realise "what a terrible
disadvantage" the established use of statistical methods means
"to the clarity of our concepts and more importantly, the testability
of our theories".
For our part we believe that it is not the statistical methods as
such but their methodologically unsound application which
should be blamed. Because of this we recommend the application
of the statistical methods according to the methodological
principles of the adjusted strong inference. This means, in general,
that the rule of the severity of test is taken into consideration in
the design and analysis of data generation. Data especially
should be generated and analysed from those parts of the domain
of the theory in which the theory predicts some new or
independent facts not known or exploited in its construction. In
such a situation the results of the statistical tests and analyses
may reach the status of genuine or powerful evidence as well.
Our third point concerning the explorative approach in ecology
is, that it is more accidental than usual that the data is able to
reveal the real order in the behaviour of the object even if it is
generated independently or before any ideas concerning this
order. A simple explanation for this is that even when we begin
with a correct idea of the order in the behaviour of the object it is
often difficult to design and implement a system of data generation
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able to give an unbiased and reliable expression to it. The data do
not speak for themselves. The appearances of things do not
reveal their essences immediately. The data must be made to
speak. The appearances revealing the essences must be
intentionally produced. The use of statistical methods alone is
not enough for this. In addition the theoretical ideas of the order
sought for and careful design of the data generation is needed for
its detection.
We admit, however, with Quinn and Dunham, that it is no
easy matter to decompose the multiple causality in living nature
into a handful of principal factors of the theory, the effects of
which can clearly be seen in the data generated. The systematic
factors provided by an ecological theory are usually able to
explain only a very limited part of the actual variation in the data.
Thus, other systematic and random factors acting on the data
generation are prone to produce vast amounts of unexplained
variation. This situation has discouraged the theoretical approach
in ecology in general and in the statistical analysis of ecological
data in particular.
We think that a partial solution to this problem is that the
generation of ecological data and its statistical modelling should
be based on more clearly formulated and better grounded theories
of data generation. Such theories may increase the possibilities of
severe testing in ecology by reducing the amount of unexplained
variation and by bringing the order of living nature more clearly
into view.
Of course, it may be that in the end we must acknowledge that
there exist many cases in ecology where the imperfections in
models and the uncertainties in the data generation cannot be
reduced to such an extent that the conditions of strong inference
would be satisfied. But if and when we stick to the principles of
strong inference as our methodological ideal, this would mean
only that the evidential support of the ecological theories and
models would remain at a low level. If on the other hand we
believe that better results; that is, results with greater explanatory
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power and stronger evidential support are desirable and attainable
in ecology, we must try to develop theory construction and the
data generation further in the direction required by strong
inference.
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Connections with other approaches. The elements of our Guide-
Dog Approach can be found in the literature published recently
in the philosophy and methodology of science. We are indebted
to Hoyningen-Huene 1993, Kuhn 1962, Lakatos 1970, and Laudan
1977, for instance, for our ideas concerning the importance of the
paradigmatic and conceptual background in the research process.
Our views concerning the importance and nature of theory and
theory construction have been strongly influenced by, for instance,
Bhaskar 1975, Bunge 1985, Giere 1988, Kantorowich 1993, Lakatos
1970, McMullin 1976, Novak 1980, Popper 1963, and Suppe 1989.
As regards our ideas of the importance and nature of the theory
of data generation we want to mention the writings of Blalock
and Blalock 1968, Bunge 1970, Lakatos 1970, Spanos 1986, Suppe
1989 and Suppes 1962. Our views concerning the nature of
scientific inference and the relationship between theory and
experience have their roots in the writings of Popper (Popper
1959, 1963, 1972).
We are not, of course, the first to apply the views mentioned
above, to the ecology. Brennan 1988, Hagen 1989, McIntosh 1980
and 1985, O'Neill et al. 1986, Regier and Raport 1978, and Sirtherlof
1980 for example have analysed the conceptual and theoretical
background of ecological research, while Loehle 1987 and Tuomi
1981 have applied the ideas of Bunge and Lakatos in their
analyses of the theory construction and testing in ecology and
evolutionary biology. Further Lastowski (1977) and Richardson
(1988) have analysed the use of idealisations in theory construction
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in population genetics. Lloyd (1988) and Thompson (1988) have
applied the structuralist approach in the analysis of biological
theories. On the other hand, Fretwell (1975), Hall (1988), Simberloff
(1983) and Strong (1983), have defended the Popperian approach
in ecology, and so on.
In general methodological discussion many of the
methodological approaches mentioned above have, however,
interpreted and presented as excluding or contradicting each
other. If a commentator has adopted the Kuhnian view, he has
abandoned the Popperian view. If he has adopted the structuralist
view he has abandoned the realist and Popperian views, for
instance, because they represent the so-called statement view of
the nature of theory, which is incompatible with the non-statement
view of structuralism, and so on. This antagonism is
understandable, because the originators of these views have
often argued against each other.
We do not however accept the interpretation that these
methodological approaches exclude each other, as being the only
ones possible. If we can claim any originality in our Guide-Dog
approach it is this: we have combined some methodological
approaches which, in their usual forms, have been opposed to
each other. In addition, we have taken some steps ahead in
analysis, which aims, from this combined methodological point
of view, to explicate more thoroughly the integrated processes of
theory construction and testing.
The methodological manifesto of the Guide-Dog approach.
The methodological manifesto we are ready to present for
ecological research on the basis of our Guide-Dog methodology
can be summarised as follows: the research process must be seen
as an integrated whole consisting of the processes of theory
construction and data generation.
As regards theory construction, our manifesto emphasises the
following points:
1) The importance of background assumptions. All kinds of
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background assumptions and concepts direct and shape
conceptualisation, theorisation and observation of the research
objects. Consequently beside these objects they have an important
effect on the results of research.
The importance of theory. Theory and theory construction
has an essential role in all scientific research. When the aim of
research is to understand or explain phenomena, collecting and
analysing data is not enough. Theories are needed which for
example describe the causal structures underlying the observed
facts.
The realistic conception of theory. The defining character of
a scientific theory is not that it describes the research object as it
is observed by us but that it describes it as it is in itself and
independently of us and our observations; that is, theory
represents the supposedly real and essential properties of its
object.
Gradual process of theory construction. The theoretical
content of a theory is gradually constructed or explicated by
using the methods of idealisation and concretisation resulting in
theoretical models with variable degrees of generality, realism
and accuracy.
As regards data generation, our manifesto stresses the
importance of the following points:
The requirement of testability. Although we criticise
empiricism we accept its requirement of empirical testability as
such. Because of the theory-laden or theory-impregnated nature
of data, the real process of testing, however, is much more
complicated, difficult, fallible and slower than empirical
approaches tempt us to think
6) The importance of the theory of data generation. The
researcher needs — especially in complicated situations typical
to ecological research— a clear and well-grounded theory of data
generation. It increases his/her opportunities to identify correctly
the empirical content of the theory being tested and to design and
implement a process of data generation which is able to produce
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relevant, unbiased, reliable and evidentially powerful data.
The construction of the theory of data generation. This
theory — like all other theories — abstracts and idealises its real
object and its construction proceeds gradually towards a more
and more accurate and realistic determination of the process of
data generation.
Adjusted strong inference. The central idea of strong
inference is that the theory should take a real risk of being refuted
by data. We believe that strong inference should be applied in an
adjusted form. This means that ecological theories and their
empirical contents should be formulated clearly and definitely
and that the relevant auxiliary assumptions needed in these
formulations should be recognised and critically evaluated before
any conclusions are drawn.
We admit, of course, that methodological considerations and
programmes have only limited importance in solving the
substantial research problems facing ecology. Even if poor
methodology can effectively hinder success in research, good
methodology cannot guarantee it. In the end success depends on
what the world is, and what ideas, theories and instruments of
observation we are able to devise. Guide Dog is ready. Have a try!
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In ecology the central problem is not the lack of theory or the
lack of data but the lack of research able to link them
systematically and critically. The description and analysis of
such an integrated research process is the focus of the present
study. Our approach is called the Guide-Dog approach, because
we hope that it is able to guide all those who are blinded or
perplexed by the increasing technical sophistication and
fragmentation of modern science.
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